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To effectively respond to vulnerabilities, 
information must not only be collected efficiently and 
quickly but also the vulnerability and the attack 
techniques must be understood. A security knowledge 
repository can collect such information. The Common 
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) provides known 
vulnerabilities of products, while the Common Attack 
Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) 
stores attack patterns, which are descriptions of the 
common attributes and approaches employed by 
adversaries to exploit known weaknesses. Because the 
information in these two repositories is not directly 
related, identifying the related CAPEC attack 
information from the CVE vulnerability information is 
challenging. One proposed method traces some related 
CAPEC-ID from CVE-ID through Common Weakness 
Enumeration (CWE). However, it is not applicable to all 
patterns. Here, we propose a method to automatically 
trace the related CAPEC-IDs from CVE-ID using TF-
IDF and Doc2Vec. Additionally, we experimentally 
confirm that TF-IDF is more accurate than Doc2vec. 
 
1. Introduction  
System administrators spend a lot of time dealing 
with vulnerabilities due in part to their sheer volume. To 
effectively respond and mitigate vulnerabilities, not 
only must vulnerability information be collected 
efficiently and quickly but also the vulnerability and the 
attack techniques utilizing the vulnerability must be 
understood. For example, when performing a 
penetration test, it is essential to refer to information 
about known vulnerabilities and attacks. 
To collect such information, knowledge repositories 
on cyber-security issues may be used.  Public 
repositories include Common Vulnerabilities and 
Exposures (CVE) [1] and Common Attack Pattern 
Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) [2]. CVE lists 
common identifiers for known vulnerability information. 
CAPEC is a dictionary of common identifiers for attack 
patterns employed by adversaries to exploit weaknesses. 
CVE and CAPEC should both be used to implement 
an efficient penetration test. A vulnerability scanner can 
automatically detect CVE-IDs, but the CVE does not 
contain attack information. Therefore, we add attack 
information using the CAPEC attack patterns. Because 
CVE and CAPEC are not directly related, identifying 
the related CAPEC attack information from the CVE 
vulnerability information is difficult, especially for 
those without experience. Currently, Common 
Weakness Enumeration (CWE) [3], which is a list of 
common identifiers of types of security weaknesses, is 
employed to identify the relationships between CVE and 
CAPEC (Fig. 1).  “Weakness Enumeration” contains 
information about the relationship between the CVE 
vulnerability information and CWE. "Related Attack 
Patterns" includes the CAPEC attack pattern 
information related to the CWE information. CWE can 
trace the related CAPEC-ID from CVE-ID. In this paper, 
we refer to this method as the “conventional method”. 
The conventional method has two issues: 
 It cannot trace some patterns of the related 
CAPEC-IDs from CVE-IDs when using CWE. 
Sections 3.2 and 5.3 mention specific patterns and 
conditions.  
 Mappings between repositories are created 





manually. Manual mapping cannot handle the 
growing amount of vulnerability information. In 
addition, the number of mapping failures is rising. 
Currently, CVE and CAPEC are not explicitly 
mapped. It is preferable for the authors of CVE-ID to 
map it directly to CAPEC. However, accurate mapping 
is costly and difficult. This paper aims to trace the 
related CAPEC-ID directly from the CVE-ID. Our 
method suggests which CAPEC-ID should be related to 
a given CVE-ID. It does not provide a definitive “best” 
CAPEC-ID. Herein we calculate the similarity between 
CVE descriptions and CAPEC descriptions. 
We propose two approaches to calculate similarity: 
Doc2Vec [4] and TF-IDF [5]. TF-IDF calculates the 
similarity of sentences by the number of occurrences of 
words, whereas Doc2Vec calculates the similarity of 
sentences by the distributed representation of sentences. 
We chose a representative similarity measure. These 
methods have been employed in previous studies [6], [7], 
but they have not been accurately evaluated or directly 
compared. Here, these two approaches are compared to 
the conventional one by tracing the related CAPEC-IDs 
from 44 CVE-IDs. Although other approaches can 
measure similarity such as LSI and Word Mover's 
Distance, evaluating these remains a future work. Our 
approach is described in detail in Section 4. 
This paper aims to answer the following three 
Research Questions (RQs): 
RQ1. How accurately can the relationships of 
security repositories be traced from CVE-ID to 
CAPEC-ID? This question assesses the trace 
accuracy of CAPEC-ID from CVE-ID.   
RQ2. When using similarity based on natural 
language processing and machine learning, how 
accurate is the tracing from CVE-ID to CAPEC-ID? 




Figure 1. Relationships between security 
knowledge repositories 
RQ3. Which of the three evaluated methods 
provides the best results? This question determines 
the most effective method among the conventional 
method and the two methods proposed in RQ2. 
The contributions of this paper are twofold: 
1. We clarify the mapping accuracy between 
security knowledge repositories. 
2. Our method can easily identify CAPEC-IDs that 
are mapping candidates and assist in the mapping 
process. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
introduces related works. Section 3 provides the 
background and motivating example. Section 4 explains 
our approach. Section 5 describes the results of the 
experiment and discusses the RQs. Section 6 presents 
our conclusions and future work. 
2. Related Work 
Previous studies have investigated vulnerabilities 
contained in repositories [6], [7], [8], [9], [10]. One 
study, which examined only the Software Defined 
Networking and Network Functions Virtualization 
vulnerability, also employed TF-IDF [6]. However, 
repositories have yet to be comprehensively evaluated. 
Although [7] had a similar objective as this study, they 
used Doc2vec without an explicit assessment, which 
made it difficult to evaluate the performance of the 
matching process.  
Another study automatically mapped CVE to 
CAPEC and ATT&CK to find appropriate mitigation 
measures [8]. They created a neural network model with 
automatic classification in an attempt to realize a deep 
learning model that groups CWEs into CAPECs. 
However, they only suggested a method. On the other 
hand, this study conducts experiments with 44 CVE-IDs 
and prepares the correct CAPEC-ID. 
Some studies examine the usage of topic modeling 
and natural language processing to extract hidden topics 
from the textual description of each attack pattern and 
learn the parameters of a topic model [11], [12]. 
Although we performed a simple natural language 
process, the topic analysis performed in these other 
papers is a useful reference for future applications of 
topic analysis. 
The literature reports applications of topic analysis 
[13], [14]. In particular, one study proposes a hybrid 
method combining TF-IDF-weighted Doc2Vec and TF-
IDF-weighted VSM [13]. This approach should be 
useful to improve the similarity measurement in this 
study. 
Other studies investigated vulnerability ontology 
models [15], [16], [17]. They researched vulnerability 
models based on well-known public databases in the 
field of security such as CVE, CWE, and CAPEC. 
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Several studies have investigated security measures 
using security knowledge repositories. One study 
created a vulnerability management ontology that ranks 
attacks by security knowledge repositories [18]. 
Another study defined a framework to prioritize 
vulnerabilities [19]. Several studies have focused on 
mining methods and information retrieval for a security 
knowledge repository [20], [21], [22], [23], [24]. These 
papers mined each repository using their relationships. 
However, verifying the accuracy of the identified 
relationships were beyond the scope of these studies. 
Herein we evaluate the accuracy of the relationships 
between repositories. 
Our method can propose attack patterns for a 
Penetration Tester. Several papers on penetration testing 
have introduced the Vulnerability Assessment and 
Penetration Test process [25], [26], [27]. Similar to this 
study, the authors of [27] performed penetration testing 
using CVE and CAPEC. Unlike our method, their 
method used the relationships between knowledge 
repositories. 
3. Background 
3.1. Security Knowledge repository 
Many repositories disclose information about 
vulnerabilities. Here, a security knowledge repository is 
described. 
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE). 
CVE is a dictionary of common identifiers for known 
vulnerabilities. It includes more than 130,000 
vulnerabilities. 
National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [28]. NVD 
is the U.S. government repository of standards-based 
vulnerability management data, which is represented 
using the Security Content Automation Protocol 
(SCAP). NVD is fully synchronized with CVE. It 
includes the Common Vulnerability Scoring System 
(CVSS), Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE), 
Common Platform Enumeration (CPE), and other 
related database information. 
Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE). CWE is a 
list of common software security weaknesses. It 
identifies categories of vulnerabilities. Each CWE-ID is 
assigned to create a hierarchical structure. Each CWE-
ID is documented with a panoply of information, 
including a description, related Attack Pattern (CAPEC-
ID), etc. 
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and 
Classification (CAPEC). CAPEC is a comprehensive 
dictionary of attack patterns employed by adversaries to 
exploit known weaknesses. Attack patterns are 
descriptions of common attributes and approaches used 
by attackers to exploit known weaknesses. CAPEC 
helps understand the specific elements of an attack and 
how to prevent a successful attack. 
3.2. Motivating Example 
Although CWE can trace some of the related 
CAPEC-ID from CVE-ID, it cannot trace all patterns. 
An example is CVE-2018-18442, which is a 
vulnerability related to a weakness due to flooding of 
network packets. The description of CVE-2018-18442 
is as follows: 
D-Link DCS-825L devices with firmware 1.08 do 
not employ a suitable mechanism to prevent denial-
of-service (DoS) attacks. An attacker can harm the 
device availability (i.e., live-online video/audio 
streaming) by using the hping3 tool to perform an 
IPv4 flood attack. Verified attacks includes SYN 
flooding, UDP flooding, ICMP flooding, and SYN-
ACK flooding. [29] 
There is an attack pattern identifier for Flooding in 
CAPEC-125. However, CVE-2018-18442 is also 
related to CWE-20. Because CAPEC-125 cannot be 
traced from CWE-20, CAPEC-125 cannot be identified. 
By tracing the relationship between security knowledge 
repositories, we found that the correct CAPEC-ID could 
not be identified. The exact number of CVE-IDs that 
cannot be mapped to CAPEC via CWE is unknown. 
Since the issue is the use of CWE, it is preferable to 
directly trace from CVE to CAPEC. This is our 
motivation. Section 5.2 also references problems about 
CVE-IDs, which are impossible to map to CAPEC via 
CWE. 
4. Tracing method from CVE-ID to 
CAPEC-ID 
We considered how to trace CAPEC from CVE 
directly. We used similarity to trace the related CAPEC-
IDs from a CVE-ID. Figure 2 overviews our method, 
which consists of three steps. First, a CVE-ID is inputted. 
For example, CVE-2018-18442 is used as the input data 
in Fig. 2. Second, the similarity between the description 
of the inputted CVE-ID and that of all CAPEC-IDs is 
calculated. Finally, the CAPEC documents are sorted by 
the similarity score. 
We investigated two methods for the similarity 
measurements: TF-IDF and Doc2Vec. TF-IDF 
evaluates the importance of words in a document. It is a 
simple natural language process and is typically used to 
search for similar documents. On the other hand, 
Doc2Vec creates a paragraph vector and calculates the 
similarity. A machine learning model is built through 
averaging, combining, and estimating. Therefore, the 
results of the natural language processing depend on the  
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Figure 2. Overview of our method 
 
machine learning model. 
We describe each approach in detail below. Both 
approaches find the related CAPEC-ID in CVE-2018-
18442. Eventually, we aim to identify CAPEC-125 from 
the CAPEC-ID. 
4.1. Tracing method based on Doc2Vec 
Doc2Vec uses the genism [30] doc2vec python 
library. The embedding vectors obtained from the text 
are used to calculate the similarity using the cosine 
similarity. A value close to 1 indicates similarity, 
whereas a value close to 0 indicates dissimilarity, which 
is typical for cosine trigonometric functions. Two 
models have been proposed to create a paragraph vector: 
The Distributed Memory Model of Paragraph Vectors 
(PV-DM) and the Distributed Bag of Words version of 
Paragraph Vector (PV-DBOW) Here, we use the PV-
DBOW. DBOW ignores the word order, forcing the 
model to predict words randomly sampled from the 
paragraph in the output. Although PV-DM is more 
accurate because it considers the word order, we felt that 
the word order was not relevant when comparing the 
CVE and CAPEC descriptions. For example, the CVE 
describes it as a “brute force password attack”, while 
CAPEC describes it as “brute force attack on passwords” 
or “Password Brute Forcing”. Figure 3 shows the flow 
of the Doc2Vec approach using CVE-2018-18442 as an 
example. Table 1 shows the final results. The algorithm 
of the Doc2Vec approach is as follows: 
STEP 1: Preprocess Data. The training data is the 
text of the Description section in CVE and CAPEC. All 
training data are given a Paragraph_id. There are 515 
CAPEC-IDs (CAPEC-434 and 435 are excluded 
because their Description sections are blank). Each 
CAPEC-ID is given a Paragraph_id from 0 to 514. 
There are 131684 CVE-IDs. Each CVE-ID is given a 
Paragraph_id from 515 to 132198. 
STEP 2: Create a Doc2Vec model. The formed 
training data is used to train the Doc2Vec model. Then 
a distributed representation of all the training data can 
be acquired. 
STEP 3: Use the variance representation acquired in 
step 2 to find the similarity. Using the 
“self.wv.n_similarity” method [30] provides the 
similarity between paragraphs. The 
“self.wv.n_similarity” method gives two Paragpaph_id. 
This is the input data for our method. In Fig. 3, the 
Paragraph_id of CVE-2018-18442 is set to 1200. Then 
the Paragraph_ids, which range from 0 to 514, are 
inputted individually. 
STEP 4: Obtain the similarity and sort. STEP 3 
produces the similarity between the input Paragraph_ids. 
Consequently, the similarity scores between the 
inputted CVE-ID (CVE-2018-18442) and all CAPEC-
IDs are determined. Then the scores are sorted in 
descending order. The ID with a higher rank is the 
related CAPEC-ID. 
 
Table 1. List of CAPEC-ID rankings related to 
CVE-2018-18442 (Doc2Vec) 
Rank CAPEC-ID Similarity 
1 49 0.199 
2 104 0.196 
3 291 0.188 
4 27 0.187 
5 528 0.185 
6 331 0.184 
7 300 0.181 
8 168 0.177 
9 486 0.174 
10 462 0.173 …
 
198 125 0.0659 …
 
515 503 -0.131 
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Figure 3. Overview of the tracing method 
based on Doc2Vec 
4.2. Tracing method based on TF-IDF 
In TF-IDF, we use scikit-learn [31]. Herein, we use 
the "TfidfVectorizer" method. Figure 4 shows the flow 
of the TF-IDF approach using CVE-2018-18442 as an 
example. Table 2 shows the final results. The algorithm 
of the TF-IDF approach is as follows: 
STEP1: Input Data. Input all CAPEC descriptions 
and the description of one CVE-ID as a corpus.  
STEP 2: Preprocess Data. Preprocess the corpus 
with the most common words removing punctuation, 
tokenization, and lemmatization. 
STEP 3: Obtain a matrix of TF-IDF features. 
Convert a collection of corpuses to a matrix of TF-IDF 
features using “TfidfVectorizer”. 
STEP 4: Get the TF-IDF scores. Use “fit_transform” 
to learn the matrix of TF-IDF features and return the TF-
IDF-weighted document-term matrix. 
STEP 5: Sort the TF-IDF scores. STEP 4 produces 
the TF-IDF scores between the inputted CVE-ID (CVE-
2018-18442) and all CAPEC-IDs. The scores are sorted 
in descending order, and the ID with the higher rank is 
the related CAPEC-ID. 
Table 2. List of CAPEC-ID rankings related to 
CVE-2018-18442 (TF-IDF) 
Rank CAPEC-ID Similarity 
1 49 0.199 
2 104 0.196 
3 291 0.188 
4 147 0.140 
5 488 0.129 
6 184 0.122 
7 469 0.121 
8 594 0.116 
9 125 0.100 
10 308 0.979 
…
 
515 650 0 
 
 
Figure 4. Overview of the tracing method 
based on TF-IDF 
5. Experiments and Results 
We prepared 44 CVE-IDs and used them as input 
data. We tested whether we could trace CAPEC-IDs 
related to each of the 44 CVE-IDs. In the evaluation, we 
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calculated the Recall@10. Recall@n indicates the 
proportion of relevant items found in the top-n 
recommendations. The RQs questions were answered 
using the tracing results of the 44 CVE-IDs. 
5.1. 44CVE-IDs 
CAPEC contains the Example Instance field, which 
lists the specific vulnerabilities targeted by this exploit 
instance of the attack. CVE-ID may be listed in this field. 
Example Instance field contained 7 CVE-IDs in 1999, 4 
CVE-IDs in 2000, 4 CVE-IDs in 2001, 2 CVE-IDs in 
2002, 1 CVE-ID in 2003, 3 CVE-IDs in 2004, 3 CVE-
IDs in 2005, 13 CVE-IDs in 2006, 4 CVE-IDs in 2007, 
2 CVE-IDs in 2010, and 1 CVE-ID in 2016. Hence, 
there are a total of 44 CVE-IDs listed. The average 
number of words is 36. The median is 34. The maximum 
is 81, and the minimum is 9. To evaluate the correctness 
of the tracing results using our method requires correct 
data, we selected these 44 CVE-IDs. If a CVE-ID listed 
in the Example Instance of a CAPEC-ID is used as input 
data, whether the corresponding CAPEC-ID is 
successfully traced can be verified. Originally, the 
mapping from CVE to CAPEC is many-to-many, but in 
this experiment, we assume that it is many-to-one. 
5.2. RQ 1. How accurately can the relationships 
of security repositories be traced from CVE-ID 
to CAPEC-ID? 
When tracing the relationships between repositories, 
we successfully traced 2 of the 44 CVE-IDs using the 
conventional method. This low accuracy is attributed to 
the relationship between CVE (NVD) and CWE. NVD 
is fully synchronized with CVE. We analyzed the 
accuracy of the mapping between CVE (NVD) and 
CWE. 
The NVD webpage contains a section called 
“Weakness Enumeration”. This section provides 
information about the relationship between CVE-ID and 
CWE. There are four patterns of information in this 
relationship. Information in the first pattern is written 
with a CWE-ID. Information in the second pattern is 
written with multiple CWE-IDs. The information in the 
third pattern is written “NVD-CWE-Other”. 
Information in the fourth pattern is written with “NVD-
CWE-noinfo”. In the cases of “NVD-CWE-Other” 
and “NVD-CWE-noinfo”, information cannot be traced 
to CAPEC-ID because it is not mapped to CWE-ID. 
Figure 5 shows the percentage of information for these 
relationships. Approximately 30% of CVE-IDs are not 
mapped to CWE-IDs.  
When aggregated by year, the percentage of CVE-
ID mapped to CWE-ID has increased each year (Fig. 6). 
In particular, the percentage of CVE-IDs mapped to 
CWE-ID has increased dramatically since 2008. The 
increasing percentage of CVE-IDs mapped to CWE-ID 
highlights the importance of accurate mapping of CWE-
ID. However, bias is a problem. There are 839 CWE-
IDs, of which only 149 are used to map CVE-IDs. 
Figure 7 shows the distribution for the top 15 mapped 
CWE-IDs listed. 
Figure 7 focuses on CWE-20 and CWE-200. These 
two CWE-IDs have very high abstraction levels, 
indicating that many CAPEC-IDs are listed in the 
Related Attack Pattern section. CWE-20 has a 
relationship with 51 CAPEC-IDs, while CWE-200 has 
a relationship with 58 CAPEC-IDs. Due to these large 








Figure 6. Changes in the percentage of CVE-ID 
that is mapped to CWE-ID 
 
 
Figure 7. Vulnerability distribution by CWE-ID 
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We analyzed CWE-20 in detail. CWE-20 is the 
parent node of the path traversal, buffer error, XSS, and 
injection. It covers a lot of weaknesses. The reason is 
described on the CWE-20 webpage: 
The “input validation” term is extremely common, 
but it is used in many different ways. In some cases 
its usage can obscure the real underlying weakness 
or otherwise hide chaining and composite 
relationships. 
Some people use “input validation” as a general 
term that covers many different neutralization 
techniques for ensuring that input is appropriate, 
such as filtering, canonicalization, and escaping. 
Others use the term in a more narrow context to 
simply mean “checking if an input conforms to 
expectations without changing it.” [32] 
As shown above, it is easy to understand why CWE-
20 is often mapped from CVE-ID. However, CVE-IDs 
mapped for this reason cannot provide useful 
vulnerability information from CWE.  
As discussed in Section 2.2, we introduced a pattern 
that CAPEC-ID cannot identify. CVE-2014-0160, 
which is a vulnerability about Buffer Overread, is 
another example. The description of CVE-2014-0160 is 
as follows: 
The (1) TLS and (2) DTLS implementations in 
OpenSSL 1.0.1 before 1.0.1g do not properly 
handle Heartbeat Extension packets, which allows 
remote attackers to obtain sensitive information 
from process memory via crafted packets that 
trigger a buffer over-read, as demonstrated by 
reading private keys, related to d1_both.c and 
t1_lib.c, aka the Heartbleed bug. [33] 
CAPEC-540 contains an attack pattern identifier for 
Buffer Overread. There is a weakness identifier for 
Buffer Overread in CWE-126. However, the “Weakness 
Enumeration” section of CVE-2014-0160 says CWE-
119 (Buffer Errors). Hence, CAPEC-540 cannot be 
traced from CWE-119. Why is it mapped to CWE-119? 
CVE-2014-0160 involves multiple weaknesses in 
CWE-125, 126, and 130. These three CWE-IDs are 
recognized as identifiers related to the Heartbleed bug. 
Despite this fact, we believe that the CWE-119 mapping 
is because it allows for a single identifier to indicate the 
presence of multiple weaknesses. Hence, we found that 
the CWE-ID described in Weakness Enumeration does 
not characterize an attacker's use of a vulnerability to 
attack. 
 
Result of RQ 1. Only 2 out of the 44 CVE-IDs 
were traced to the related CAPEC-ID. Useful 
information about the attack that can be traced 
is inaccurate. 
5.3. RQ 2. When using similarity based on 
natural language processing and machine 
learning, how accurate is the tracing from CVE-
ID to CAPEC-ID? 
The respective results of Doc2Vec and TF-IDF are 
described below. We traced the related CAPEC-IDs 
from the 44 CVE-IDs using the method described in 
Section 4. 
 
Result of RQ 2. Doc2Vec traced 4 of the 44 CVE-
IDs to the related CAPEC-ID. In contrast, TF-
IDF traced 33 of the 44 CVE-IDs to the related 
CAPEC-ID. 
5.4. RQ 3. Which of three evaluated methods 
provides the best results? 
Figure 8 plots the experimental results for the Recall 
to trace related CAPEC-IDs from CVE-ID by the 
proposed method. TF-IDF yielded the best results. It 
successfully traced 33 of the 44 CVE-IDs. As a result, 
we could trace related CAPEC-IDs from CVE-ID in a 
keyword-based search. The CVE description word 
count does not affect the NLP approach. Currently, the 
search scope is narrow as it is limited to the text in the 
Description section of CAPEC. However, the accuracy 
of TF-IDF should improve upon widening the search 
scope. In addition, instead of relying on the TF-IDF 
measure, we would like to aggregate the TF-IDF 
measure and use the overlap score [34]. 
We believe that the corpus is a factor for why TF-
IDF was more accurate than Doc2Vec. TF-IDF is better 
suited for smaller, more focused corpora. On the other 
hand, Doc2Vec is better for handling large corpora that 
span many topics. In this study, the accuracy of TF-IDF 
improved because the topic was limited to security. 




Figure 8. Recall for each approach 
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Herein all the text in the Description section of CVE 
and the Description section of CAPEC was trained as 
training data. The text in the Description section of CVE 
is often canned, which leads to biased training data. We 
believe that this bias decreased the accuracy. The reason 
for the low accuracy of the conventional method, as 
confirmed in RQ1, is the poor accuracy of the 
relationships between repositories. Most of the 44 CVE-
IDs handled in the experiment were “NVD-CWE-
Other”. Hence, it cannot be traced to CAPEC-ID 
because it is not mapped to CWE-ID, resulting in a 
lower recall. Changing CVE-ID in the experiment 
should alter the result of the conventional method. 
 
Result of RQ 3. All three methods can realize a 
trace, but the TF-IDF is the most accurate. 
6. Conclusion 
Herein we propose an approach to trace the related 
CAPEC-ID directly from CVE-ID. The conventional 
tracing method uses the relationships between each 
repository. However, not only is manual tracing 
required, but accuracy may also be an issue. Our 
proposed tracing method uses similarity. The similarity 
between CVE-ID and CAPEC-ID is calculated using 
two different measurements: Doc2Vec and TF-IDF. TF-
IDF had a higher accuracy, but the results suggest that 
the Doc2Vec model can be improved. 
Our method does not currently address the severity 
of each vulnerability. However, this is a topic for future 
work. Additionally, we need to enhance the accuracy of 
each approach. The first step is to expand the search 
scope to include text from other sections as well as that 
in the Description section. Moreover, the training data 
in Doc2Vec needs to be modified. The second step is to 
improve the accuracy of our training data using news 
articles about security as training data. Although we 
used CAPEC in this paper, other attack patterns are 
based on pattern language. In the future, we plan to 
evaluate attack patterns other than CAPEC as candidates 
for tracing. Moreover, we would like to improve the 
accuracy and increase the amount of information to 
provide useful cybersecurity information. By collecting, 
identifying, and analyzing data directly from security 
knowledge repositories, we hope to develop the 
proposed method into comprehensive and proactive 
Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) research [35], [36] or 
extend the tracking by organizing the relationships 
between security concepts with metamodel [37]. 
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